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For my own edification in preparation for this project, I watched
the classic American film, To Kill A Mockingbird. The central charac-
ter inspired the title of this essay.1 I watched the film for several rea-
sons, but mostly because when the title, What Would Make Atticus
Finch Flinch?, was suggested to me, I could not recall who in the world
Atticus Finch was, and therefore, I could not understand why my audi-
ence or readers should care about what would make him flinch
As I learned through viewing or reviewing the film, Atticus
Finch is a figure who represents an ideal of the good, ethical lawyer.
His qualities include a devotion to justice that puts him and even his
family in jeopardy. He helps the poor with their legal problems and
even accepts barter as a fee. Atticus approaches law as a learned pro-
fession, not a business. We learn in the course of the film that Atticus
is competent and skilled at what he does, though he recognizes his own
limits, leading one of his neighbors to comment, "Well, he can make
somebody's will so airtight can't anybody meddle with it."2 He is genu-
inely sensitive to the feelings of others, not only those of his clients,
and tolerant of their differences. While Atticus is both charming and
polite, and accepts the informality of being called "Atticus" by every-
one, he is, above all, dutiful to the demands of his profession. When
asked, he accepts without hesitation the pro bono defense of the crimi-
nal defendant, Tom Robinson, a black man accused of raping a white
woman in the South in the 1930's. Beyond his strong sense of ethical
obligation, Atticus is an idealist lawyer: in a seated segregated court-
room, before an all male, all white jury, he argues that "[i]n our courts,
all men are created equal,"3 and seems to actually believe it.
* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. B.A., Northwestern University, 1984; M.A.,
M.Phil., Yale University, 1987; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, 1992; Ph.D., Yale University,
1993. Many thanks to Professor Alan Childress for his helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this essay.
1. This paper was originally prepared as a lecture for the Defense Research
Institute's Toxic Torts & Environmental Law Seminar in New Orleans, March 18-19, 2004.
2. Harper Lee, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 104 (HarperCollins Publishers 1995) (1960).
3. Id. at 234.
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In this essay, I propose that few practices or trends within the
legal profession as it has developed since the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Code went into effect in 1970 would be more likely to
make Atticus Finch flinch than this: the practice of engaging in secret
settlements in cases where public safety is at risk or public interest
affected. There are many examples of these risks. From lawsuits over
exploding Ford Pinto gas tanks4 and the revelation in the 1970s of se-
cret settlements by Johns-Manville of asbestos-related litigation
claims 5, to the Firestone/Ford tire suits of the 1990's,6 it has been
charged that settlements cloaked in secrecy kept regulatory agencies
as well as consumers in the dark for years. The Johns-Manville secret
settlements, for instance, occurred in 1933, when lawyer conduct
would have been governed by neither the 1970 Model Code nor the
Model Rules (adopted in 1983 by the American Bar Association House
of Delegates), but rather by the Canons of Ethics (adopted- in 1908).
Whether governed by the provisions of the Canons, the Code, or the
Rules, even as amended in 2002, ethicists (Stephen Gillers of New
York University School of Law and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania School of Law)7 have concluded that the ex-
isting rules of ethics do not forbid secret settlements.8 Secret
settlements have been used in cases involving:
" defective medical devices and pharmaceuticals, e.g., Eli Lilly's
Prozac litigation, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, and Dow
Corning's silicone gel breast implants;9
" exploding automobile fuel tanks, e.g., General Motors trucks with
side-saddle gas tanks; 10
" toxic oil spills and chemically contaminated water and soil;
4. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
Div. 2 1981). See also http://www.fordpinto.com/blowup3.htm.
5. See, e.g., Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1985).
6. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., Tires Product Liability Litigation, 134 F.
App'x 86 (7th Cir. 2005).
7. Stephen Gillers, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-sue Promises in
Settlement, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 291, 312 (2005); Keith Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defectes
Were Known in '96 But Not Reported, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Al (quoting Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr.).
8. See Richard A. Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets About Public Harm, 12 No. 4
PROF. LAW. 1 (2001), and Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized, 88 A.B.A. J. 20,
22 (Jul. 2002).
9. See Daniel W. Schuman, Making the World a Better Place Through Tort Law?
Through the Therapeutic Looking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM.RTs. 739, 750-4 (1993)
(mentioning settlements in cases involving mental illness).
10. See, e.g., Warren Brown, GM Found Negligent in Fuel Tank Case, WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 5, 1993, at Al.
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" dangerous cribs and playground equipment, e.g., Miracle Recrea-
tion Merry-go-Round;
" physical or sexual abuse of children, the elderly, or the mentally
ill, e.g., the Catholic Church scandal;
* race and sex discrimination or discrimination against those in-
fected with HIV or who have AIDS; 1 '
* tobacco; and
12
* financial fraud and corporate rip-offs
13
The absence of a legal ethics rule that would prevent lawyers
from making secret settlements in cases where public safety is at risk
or the public interest is affected has led legal ethicist Richard Zitrin,
Director of the Center for Applied Legal Ethics at the University Of
San Francisco School Of Law to propose just such a rule.14 His propo-
sal would amend Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2 to add section
(B), as follows:
(B) A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agree-
ment, whether in connection with a lawsuit or otherwise, to prevent
or restrict the availability to the public of information that the law-
yer reasonably believes directly concerns a substantial danger to
the public health or safety, or to the health or safety of any particu-
lar individual(s).
15
Zitrin's proposed amendment to 3.2 would add the following
language to the Comment section:
2. Some settlements have been facilitated by agreements to limit
the public's access to information obtained both by investigation
and through the discovery process. However, the public's interest
in being free from substantial dangers to health and safety requires
that no agreement that prevents disclosure to the public of informa-
tion that directly affects that health and safety may be permitted.
This includes agreements or stipulations to protective orders that
would prevent the disclosure of such information. It also precludes
a lawyer seeking discovery from concurring in efforts to seek such
orders where the discovery sought is reasonably likely to include
11. Karen S. Lovitch, State AIDS-Related Legislation in the 1990s: Adopting a
Language of Hope Which Affirms Life, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1187, 1191 (1996) (mentioning
settlements in AIDS related cases) (citing Joseph A. Slobdzian, 'Scott Doe' AIDS Lawsuit Is
Settled, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 1, 1994, at Al, A8).
12. Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 601, 645 (1998) (mentioning secret settlements in tobacco litigation) (citing Alix
M. Freedman and Suein L. Hwang, Phillip Morris, RJR and Tobacco Plaintiffs Discuss a
Settlement, WALL ST. J., April 16, 1997, at Al).
13. Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know
Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHmics 115, 123 (1999) (discussing a California
bill aimed at eradicating secret settlements involving financial fraud).
14. Id. at 116.
15. Id.
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information covered by subsection (B) of the rule. However, in the
event a court enters a lawful and final protective order without the
parties' agreement thereto, subsection (B) shall not require the dis-
closure of the information subject to that order.
3. Subsection (B) does not require the disclosure of the amount of
any settlement. Further, in the event of a danger to any particular
individual(s) under subsection (B), the rule is intended to require
only that the availability of information about the danger not be
restricted from any persons reasonably likely to be affected, and
from any governmental regulatory or oversight agencies that would
have a substantial interest in that danger. In such instances, the
rule is not intended to permit disclosure to persons not affected by
the dangers. 16
Zitrin's proposal is clearly not a wholesale attack on secret set-
tlements. However, it does suggest that existing ethics provisions,
court rules, and so-called "sunshine in litigation" laws17 have been in-
sufficient to curb the making of secret settlements in cases where pub-
lic safety is at risk or public interest is affected. In Part II of this
paper, I will delineate the forms that secret settlements may take and
the rationales for openness in civil as opposed to criminal litigation. In
Part III, I will examine the ethics of secrecy under existing rules and
whether there is a need for a new ethics rule. In Part IV, I will explain
my reasons for believing that, despite the current dynamism of the se-
cret settlement issue, it is unlikely that a new ethics rule governing
secret settlements will be adopted by the American Bar Association in
the near future. Finally, I will conclude with my thoughts on whether
the moral compass provided by the example of Atticus Finch should
inform how the legal profession deals with the continued use of secret
settlements.
So as not to pull any surprises at the end, let me say up front
that Atticus Finch, the American model of the good, ethical lawyer,
agreed to a secret settlement. At the moment when his family was
most threatened by the violence of white supremacy and when his chil-
dren were attacked, Atticus agreed with the constable that their at-
tacker's death would not be reported as a homicide. Atticus' daughter,
Scout, signals the denouement of the film's plot by offering a justifica-
tion for Atticus' decision to keep secret the true nature of the death.
She says to Atticus in a moment of inverted parental encouragement:
16. Id.
17. The term "sunshine in litigation" refers to reform movements that prohibit
agreements between parties which conceal public hazards or information regarding public
hazards that may go against public policy. Florida passed the first such reform in 1990 with
its Sunshine in Litigation Act which created a statutory presumption of openness in
agreements. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West 2004).
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"You see, it would be like killing a mockingbird." As we learned earlier
in the story, Atticus had been told by his father that it was a sin to kill
a mockingbird. By analogy, the mockingbird in this instance is the
savior of Atticus' children, Boo Radley, played by Robert Duvall, the
emotionally disturbed secret admirer of Atticus' children and mysteri-
ous neighbor who never left home and never grew up. Boo was the
mockingbird for Atticus' children, and his exposure to the glare of pub-
lic inquiry or even public expressions of gratitude, viewers are told,
would be enough to kill this mockingbird. Atticus' secret settlement
involved potentially criminal matters, as well as civil claims, and could
easily be characterized as a cover-up.
Thus, when I come to consider what would make Atticus Finch
flinch, I must take into account how the ideal of the good, ethical law-
yer combines with forgetfulness about moments of ethical challenge
and moral failure. And though I believe that Atticus' actions would
survive scrutiny under Professor Zitrin's proposed 3.2(B) rule, that
may say more about the limitations of the proposal than the ethical
fulfillment of the lawyer's duty to the public.
II. SECRET SETTLEMENTS
A. Defined
There are several forms that secret settlements may take. As
Zitrin's proposal makes clear, these include protective orders obtained
from a court, usually by agreement or stipulation of the parties to a
lawsuit.18 However, secret settlements may also come in the form of
standalone confidentiality agreements between disputants without the
involvement of a court, such as agreements to return unfiled discovery
from plaintiff to defendant. The sealing of court files and/or the chang-
ing (redaction) of the names of parties in a lawsuit has also been re-
ferred to as a form of secret settlement. Zitrin would consider
stipulated reversals, wherein parties may settle a case during the pen-
dency of appeal by agreeing to stipulate to reverse the trial court's
judgment, depublication of published opinions, and pre-adjudicated tri-
als, to be forms of secret settlement. 19
18. See Zitrin, supra note 13, at 118.
19. See Neary v. Regents of University of California, 834 P.2d 119 (1992) (approving
the use of stipulated reversals). See also JOHN CORNWELL, THE POWER TO HARM: MIND,
MEDICINE, AND MURDER ON TRIAL (Viking, ed., 1996) (recounting the trial and background
issues raised by the Eli Lilly Prozac litigation in which Lilly paid plaintiffs to rest their case
without presenting their strongest evidence rather than risk losing).
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Zitrin would define secret settlements as those agreements be-
tween plaintiff and defense lawyers to keep information about a known
harm from the public-whether it (is) a defective product, toxic waste,
or molesting soccer coach. 20 This definition, however, is both too broad
and too narrow, and merely restates the problem with some secret set-
tlements. In the terminology of this paper, a secret settlement will be
defined as an agreement between represented parties, with or without
the involvement of a court, or an agreement between a lawyer and a
non-client to keep public or otherwise discoverable information private.
Under this definition, a secret settlement only raises ethical concerns
either when the information withheld from public scrutiny entails a
substantial risk of continuing future harm to public safety or the public
interest is affected.
B. Rationales for Openness in Civil Litigation
Articulated rationales for openness in civil litigation often cite
the legitimacy and integrity of courts, the common law right of access
to judicial proceedings, the First Amendment, and due process. 21 Un-
like the guarantee of an open criminal trial under the Sixth Amend-
ment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
public's right of access to a civil trial, while widely recognized, is not
specifically enumerated in the federal Constitution.
22
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued and courts have
ruled that an adjudication, as opposed to pre-trial discovery proceed-
ings, constitutes a formal act of government which, in order to be ex-
cluded from public scrutiny in a free society requires that the public
interest be taken into account.
23
20. See Zitrin, supra note 8, at 1.
21. See Brian T. FitzGerald, Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly
Private, 6 J.L. & POL. 381 (Winter, 1990).
22. See U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV.
23. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
See also David A. Schulz, Rethinking Confidentiality and Access in Civil Litigation, 23
COMM. LAW. 24, 26 (Fall 2005); David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and
Practice Restricitons Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217,
1227-28 (2003); Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 317-24 (1999);
David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements by Law, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHics 125





The Model Rules, even as amended in 2002 by the ABA Ethics
2000 Commission, do not prohibit the use of secret settlements, regard-
less of whether such settlements involve keeping secret information
about a known harm or issues affecting public interest. Nevertheless,
the Model Rules are not completely irrelevant to the issue of secret
settlements. Model Rules 3.4(a),24 1.6,25 and 5.6 (b) 26 may apply in
very limited circumstances, and Rule 2.1 exhorts, but does not require,
lawyers to render advice to clients on the moral and ethical dimensions
of their actions. Since the Model Rules contemplate that the client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation shall prevail and
that the lawyer is required to consult with the client as to the means by
which to pursue these objectives, 27 any lawyer who refused to make
use of a secret settlement on behalf of a client in the proper circum-
stances quite possibly has failed to render competent representation
under the Rules.
1. Model Rule 3.4(a)
Model Rule 3.4(a) states that a lawyer shall not "unlawfully ob-
struct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy,
or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value." Model Rule 3.4(a) may apply to some secret settlements. For
example, when there is the potential that similar litigation has been
concurrently filed and that secret settlements would conceal or ob-
struct documents and other evidence needed in that trial, there may be
a duty under Model Rule 3.4(a) not to enter into such a settlement.
However, this rule would apply only in very narrow circumstances,
such as if the client informed his lawyer that the document would be
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2002) (stating that a lawyer "shall
not unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully. . .conceal a
document or other material having a potential evidentiary value").
25. See id. R. 1.6 (2002) (covering confidentiality of information in general and times at
which a lawyer might choose to reveal information otherwise protected by attorney client
privilege).
26. See id. R. 5.6(b) (2002) (stating that "a lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the
settlement of a controversy between private parties").
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.2 (2002).
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destroyed by the client or deliberately concealed in discovery during
future cases.
28
2. Model Rule 1.6
Model Rule 1.6 gives lawyers discretion to disclose information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary "to prevent reasonably certain death or sub-
stantial bodily injury."29 The American Bar Association House of
Delegates approved amendments to Model Rule 1.6 in February 2002,
so that the governing standard of Model Rule 1.6 is no longer that the
lawyer may exercise his discretion to reveal information "to prevent
the client from committing a criminal act that is likely to result in im-
minent death or substantial bodily harm."30 The change in language
from "a criminal act that is likely to result in imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm,"31 to prevention of "reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm,"32 should clearly be viewed as an increase in
the scope of lawyer discretion to reveal otherwise ethically protected
client information. With respect to secret settlements, one interpreta-
tion of the rule suggests that an attorney's agreement to a secret settle-
ment may be unethical when the bargain for settlement would require
the lawyer to sign away his discretion to disclose information about the
physical well-being of third parties in danger from something un-
earthed during discovery. However, it is important to note that this
issue has not yet been tested.33 The revelation of otherwise ethically
protected client information, even after the 2002 amendments, re-
mains discretionary for the lawyer, and does not affect the ability of a
non-lawyer to be bound by a secrecy agreement.
3. Model Rule 5.6(b)
Under Model Rule 5.6(b), an attorney may not agree to a restric-
tion upon his right to practice. Ethics opinions have been written ad-
dressing the question of whether or not an attorney may agree not to
28. See Patrick Emery Longan, Ethical Issues in Settlement Negotiation, 52 MERCER L.
REV. 807, 820-821 (Spring 2001).
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2002).
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (amended 2002).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Heather Waldbeser & Heather DeGrave, A Plaintiffs Lawyer's Dilemma: The
Ethics of Entering a Confidential Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 815, 821 (2003)
(citing Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery
Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 808 (1992)).
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use any of the information learned in the course of the current litiga-
tion in any future representation against the same defendant. 34 Pro-
fessor David Luban refers to this provision of the Model Rules as a ban
on lawyer buyouts and writes, it is "virtually the only piece of the eth-
ics codes that recognizes that accumulated legal skills are a public good
that should not be squandered on a single favorable settlement."
35
The American Bar Association Formal Opinion 93-371 (1993),
interpreting the application of Model Rule 5.6(b), led directly to a revi-
sion of the secret settlement agreement at issue in Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc.36 In Georgine, consolidated asbestos litigation con-
cluded early in 1994 between a group of experienced asbestos plaintiffs'
lawyers and the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), a claim-settling
organization incorporated by asbestos defendants. 37 The plaintiffs'
lawyers and CCR negotiated an agreement, which would potentially
affect millions of people, then filed the class action and settlement on
the same day (a so-called "settlement class action").38 After extensive
hearings, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania approved the settlement in August 1994.
3 9
The Georgine settlement established procedures and payout
schedules for the class of individuals to develop asbestos-related ill-
nesses in the future. Although future plaintiffs could opt out of the
settlement, the usual incentives likely dissuaded most from doing so,
and strictly speaking, future plaintiffs bound by the settlement were
not class members, and thus, were not represented by class counsel.
Moreover, the Georgine class was defined to exclude pre-existing asbes-
tos clients whose cases were settled by a separate agreement on more
favorable terms.40 Professor Susan Koniak estimates that by this ma-
neuver, which class counsel apparently considered a deal-breaker, law-
yers for the class increased their own fees by somewhere between 100%
and 250%.41 The pre-existing clients were being represented on a con-
tingency fee basis, which offers substantially higher compensation to
plaintiffs' attorneys than the fees established in the Georgine settle-
34. See, e.g., ABA Comm. On Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-417
(2000).
35. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L. J.
2619, 2624 (1995).
36. 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
37. Id. at 260-61.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 337.
40. Id. at 257-58.
41. See Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995).
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ment for attorneys representing members of the Georgine class. In ad-
dition, the plaintiffs' lawyers initially included "lockout agreements" in
the settlements with CCR. These are settlement terms in which the
plaintiffs' lawyers agree not to represent future claimants against the
same defendants in similar cases, an arrangement Professor Luban
calls lawyer buyout agreements.
42
After the American Bar Association issued a formal ethics opin-
ion declaring that the lockout terms would violate Model Rule 5.6(b),
the agreements were redrafted to preserve much of their force but to
avoid the technical violation.
43
Thus, an attorney may not agree to a settlement that would pro-
hibit the attorney from using any of the information learned during the
current representation in any future representation against the same
defendant. A question of the use of the information could arise in every
future case because no attorney can simply forget what he or she
learned of a defendant when preparing for future representation of
plaintiffs. However, the ABA's opinion held that Model Rule 5.6(b)
does not forbid agreements restricting the disclosure of information re-
garding the defendant. 44 The opinion reasoned that the attorney is ob-
ligated to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to the
representation of a client in any event, and a settlement agreement
prohibiting the disclosure of the information would not present any
further restriction on the attorney's rights. Under Model Rule 1.9(c), a
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a for-
mer client only if the client gives consent, a condition not likely met
when the client has agreed to a secret settlement.
4. Model Rule 2.1
Finally, Model Rule 2.1 states that a lawyer may use "consider-
ations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be
relevant to the client's situation"45 in rendering advice. This rule, how-
ever, leaves the decision ultimately with the client who can choose to
take or leave the lawyer's advice. The Model Rules as a whole are
structured to ensure that a lawyer act "in the best interest of the cli-
ent." On the other hand, nothing in the Model Rules demands that
42. Luban, supra note 35.
43. See, e.g., Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 301-02. In the new agreements, plaintiffs'
lawyers reserved the right to represent future asbestos claimants even if they opted out of
the settlement, but agreed to advise all such future clients not to opt out. Id. at 300-01.
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2002).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1. (2002).
100 [Vol. 1:1:91
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lawyers enter into secrecy agreements. As a last resort in extreme sit-
uations, Model Rule 1.16(b)(3) states that a lawyer may "withdraw
from representing a client if... a client insists upon pursuing an objec-
tive that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent. '46 Depending
on the egregiousness of the information, withdrawal may be an option
for lawyers who morally oppose secret settlements.
B. New Rule
Because no current Model Rule explicitly addresses secret set-
tlements, Professor Richard Zitrin proposed to the ABA Ethics 2000
Commission to add Rule 3.2(b) to prevent lawyers from making secret
settlements in cases where public safety is at risk or the public interest
is affected. 47 Clearly, his proposal was rejected. The Ethics 2000 Com-
mission rejected Zitrin's proposal on the grounds that "it is legal for
clients to enter such agreements," and thus "it should be ethical for a
lawyer to help the client with such an agreement by drafting it."48 Al-
though the Commission recognized the societal risks associated with
secret settlements, it concluded that "it was better to have a court rule
regulating the parties. '49
Certainly, it would be difficult to enforce Zitrin's proposed new
rule. Perhaps the most damaging criticism of the proposed new rule
was made by Professor Luban. He observed that Zitrin's rule would
not prevent parties from entering into secret settlements out of court
without lawyer assistance where such settlements are not forbidden by
law.50 Moreover, it may be very difficult to determine what amounts to
a "substantial danger" to the public health or safety. For instance, if a
lawyer gains information that one in ten thousand gas tanks explodes,
is that a substantial or insubstantial danger? What if a pharmaceuti-
cal raises the risk of cancer by one percent? Zitrin's rule leaves this
determination to the individual lawyer, making the rule difficult to ap-
ply uniformly. Additionally, it would be virtually impossible to apply
46. See id. R. 1.16(b)(3).
47. See Zitrin, supra note 13.
48. Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery
Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 807 (1992).
49. See ABA Center for Prof~l Responsibility Comm. On Evaluation of the Rules of
Prof§l Conduct, Minutes, Feb. 16-17, 2001, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-02-
16mtg.html.
50. See David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements By Law, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL
ETHmics 125, 128 (1999). Indeed, Luban suggests that Zitrin's rule would lead plaintiffs and
defendants to "simply make an end run around the lawyers who are now estopped from
participating in and negotiating the secret settlement." Id.
20061
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Zitrin's rule where the extent of the conduct and effect on public health
and safety is unpredictable, as perhaps was the case with respect to
child molestation in the Catholic Church.
Overall, it seems more promising to regulate secret settlements
that involve danger to the public health and safety, not through the
ethics rules, but through so-called "sunshine in litigation" laws, or
court rules, as has been done in some states with respect to Mary
Carter Agreements. 51 In 1989, the American Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion began intensive political activity to curtail secret settlements and
protective orders. Numerous state courts and legislatures also began
deliberating over open records or "sunshine in litigation" rules. Texas
and Florida adopted pioneering rules, and federal legislation was intro-
duced in 1995. Although it was ultimately defeated by a slim margin,
Senator Herbert Kohl, the author of the legislation, reintroduced it in
April 2003.52 Moreover, in the wake of the Firestone tire scandal, thir-
teen states considered legislation that would ban confidential settle-
ments in cases that compromise public safety. 53 As recently as 2003,
then-Governor Gray Davis of California signed into law legislation that
would prohibit secret settlements in cases involving elder abuse.
54
More broadly, in 2002, the U.S. District Court of the District of South
Carolina created a sensation when it voted unanimously to ban the se-
cret settlement of any lawsuits brought before it. 5
IV. LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER ACTION BY THE ABA
Given the Ethics 2000 Commission's rejection of Zitrin's pro-
posed new rule, the limitations of the rule in eliminating the use of
secret settlements in cases where public safety is at risk or the public
interest is affected (it only appears to restrict lawyer participation in
51. See, e.g., Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 252 N.W. 675 (1934) (holding Mary Carter
Agreements to be void); Victoria Holstein, Mary Carter's True Colors: Champertous
Settlement Agreements Under Louisiana's Nullity Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 885 (2003)
(discussing prohibition on such agreements in Texas and Florida, and proposing their
elimination in Louisiana).
52. See Kohl Press Release, available at http://www.senate.gov/-kohl/press/040803.
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the making of secret settlements), as well as the recent trend toward
dealing with the problem of secret settlements through legislation and
court rules, it appears unlikely that there will be further action by the
ABA on this issue in the near future. Indeed, as evidenced by recent
reforms through legislation and court rules-the trend to treat the mat-
ter as one of substantive law rather than as ethics-will likely take the
wind out of the sails of further efforts to turn the issue back into an
ethics one.
V. CONCLUSION: THE MORAL COMPASS OF Aricus FINCH
In light of the decision of the U.S. District Court of South Caro-
lina to ban the secret settlement of all lawsuits brought before it and
the growing trend toward imposition of "sunshine in litigation" laws
across the country, the defense bar would be well-advised to re-ex-
amine its reliance on secret settlements in cases that may involve sub-
stantial danger to the public health and safety in order to preserve the
ability to make use of secret settlements in the proper case.
Frances Komoroske suggests that it may be possible to balance
a client's needs and the public interest with a little creative lawyer-
ing.56 By this view, it is usually consistent with the client's long-term
best interest to take account of and be sensitive to the public interest
implications of litigation strategy.
The balancing suggested by Komoroske brings us back to the
ethical example of Atticus Finch. Komoroske recommends that secrecy
should never be automatic and should be accepted by the lawyer only
as a last resort.57 In the case of Atticus, he did not readily agree to the
secret settlement. In fact, Atticus's first instinct was to report the in-
formation to authorities. Komoroske also suggests that secrecy should
only be permitted in cases where there is little or no danger that the
facts of the case will be repeated, and thus there is minimal impact on
public health, safety, and welfare.58 After some consideration of what
it would mean "to kill a mockingbird," Atticus decides in the end to
agree to the secret settlement, but only because he is convinced that to
do otherwise would not achieve justice.
Nevertheless, the example of Atticus Finch is a problematic ex-
emplar of ethical lawyering. It cannot be overlooked that Atticus
56. Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret? Not If You Can Help It.
You Can Balance Your Client's Needs and the Public Interest With a Little Creative
Lawyering, 35 TRiAL 55 (June 1999).
57. Id. at 59.
58. Id. at 57.
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makes a secret settlement, not in the context of a civil suit while repre-
senting a private litigant; rather, he opts for secrecy in the context of a
criminal investigation where someone (albeit a bad man) dies. Would
Atticus' actions meet the standard set forth in Zitrin's proposed rule,
i.e., a reasonable belief that the restricted information does not directly
concern a substantial danger to the public health or safety or the
health or safety of any particular individual(s)? Even if Atticus' ac-
tions of not reporting the homicide (killing?) as a homicide met Zitrin's
proposed standard, there still may be a violation of Model Rule 3.4(a)
which prohibits unlawful obstruction of access to evidence. Moreover,
under Model Rule 8.4, it is misconduct for a lawyer to engage in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation or con-
duct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 59 The
concealment of a homicide by a lawyer, where not based on ethically
protected information, seems to qualify as prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice. What would make Atticus Finch flinch may be to con-
sider that in doing what he believed to be the morally right thing to do,
he may have crossed the ethical limits of his profession.
By empowering lawyers to make judgments about the public in-
terest, the duty to consider the public interest should be a condition of
any confidentiality agreement. This is especially necessary when in-
formation subject to a secret settlement relates to criminal matters.
Rather than eliminating the option of secret settlements, we ought to
ask whether public disclosure in any given case really serves public
safety or other well-defined public interests. If it does, we should ask
how much should be disclosed, to whom, and when. Ideally, the right
balance can be achieved by conscientious adjustments in existing prac-
tices. The trouble with eliminating secret settlements altogether is
that it would not encourage lawyers to consider the public interest at
all and may discourage litigants from seeking settlements. If
Komoroske is right that it is possible to balance the client's needs and
the public interest with a little creative lawyering, then the elimina-
tion of all secret settlements, as was done in South Carolina, over-
shoots the mark and kills the mockingbird in search of a worthy
objective.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4. (2002).
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